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Abstract
Is pricing of ICT-intense offerings following classical paths of pricing, or are they 
losing ground? Is pricing in telecom based on costing, customer value or 
something else? Who participates in creating the offerings that meet the end 
customers? And how is revenue distributed among participating actors? In this 
article, the ecology concept, with collaboration among independent actors in 
creating offerings, is explored in an attempt to find a way of analysing the 
complex web of interaction and determine the connection of pricing to costing 
and customer value. Three cases are analysed to demonstrate the approach and 
to draw tentative conclusions regarding pricing in telecom. 
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Principles for pricing 
Once upon a time, Swedish manufacturing enterprises reached an agreement on how to 
calculate full cost so that differences in price depended on efficiency differences, not on 
different computational principles (Sveriges industriförbund, 1937, Unified principles). Full 
costing as a basis for price determination then held its ground for a long period, even though 
marginal costing was viewed as an alternative in special circumstances. When I studied views 
on costing in the international pharmaceutical company Astra’s division Wet production, 
some 20 years ago, there was considerable disagreement on whether it could be appropriate to 
use marginal cost in certain cases, or if full costing should always be the basis for pricing 
(Westelius & Westelius, 1990). Perhaps, costing could be adjusted in the direction of ABC 
costing, with its ambition to find causal bases for cost distribution, rather than an ossified 
costing model of schematic cost attribution. This ambition was inspired by the then popular 
“Relevance lost” (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987), or simply by the Swedish tradition of viewing 
causal cost distribution, rather than schematic cost attribution, as the ideal (Johansson and 
Samuelson, 1988).  
 
By then, marketing people had already started out as missionaries for customer value, not 
costing, as the basis for pricing. To a profit-maximising seller, it may seem like a beautiful 
theory. To a consumer activist, the idea may seem revolting if it implies that the entire 
consumer surplus should be appropriated by the seller. But in practice, the market situation 
and the competition is what guides pricing. There are cases that resemble the perfect 
competition of economics textbooks – no material differences exist between the competitors’ 
products, and the competitors put price pressure on each other until no more than “normal” 
risk-adjusted interest on capital employed can be achieved. If there is a customer surplus, it 
stays firmly with the customers – “leaving money on the table”, as marketing people 
regrettingly term this. Provided that there is such a thing as a meaningful full cost, and that the 
competitors compute it in similar ways, an equilibrium could be established.  
The time is out of joint 
In pricing of today’s often increasingly IT-based products, these principles no longer work. 
Almost all the cost is of an investment character. R&D – the production of copies is achieved 
at no or very low direct cost. Nothing counterbalances the sales person’s wish to lower the 
price yet a little to land the deal – not unlike the Astra salesman’s wish to sell off a 
consignment on the Middle East spot market without being bothered by cost attribution to 
cover R&D or production facilities. If the customer maintains that there is no costly item 
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nothing more than the competitors’ prices that can stop the price erosion towards zero. And if 
the competitors’ salespeople argue in the same manner, the nose-diving price spiral gains 
momentum. For example, international sea cables have an estimated life expectancy of 15 
years and could take up to six years to move from idea to operational installation. But price 
per unit of North Atlantic transfer has fallen to half a per mille since 1997 (Telegeography, 
2011). Under such circumstances, it is difficult to establish meaningful life-cycle costs and to 
base pricing on them. 
 
Must this be the state of affairs? Is it reasonable that a party that produces some kind of useful 
goods or service that is in demand should find it difficult to survive because of problems of 
attaining a long-term viable price? The question is difficult to answer, but it does move the 
focus from full costing as the natural basis for pricing to some kind of agreement between the 
parties of what a reasonable compensation for each one’s contributions should be, and 
towards the question of whether long-term cooperation, where also the counterpart’s survival, 
not just the profitability of the isolated deal, is of importance. The question of fairness can be 
sharpened even further, if a party somewhere in the value system manages to reach splendid 
profitability, while others are worried about survival. The situation can resemble the internal 
debate of whether the salesperson, who “pulls in” the money to the enterprise, should have a 
considerably higher salary than the production worker or the developer who are farther from 
the source of income. Or what the individual at the organisational summit, who can lean on a 
comparison between his or her own salary and the aggregated income of the company, should 
receive as compensation in relation to the grassroots, who only have the income flows in their 
organisational proximity to leverage their claims. 
 
In the project PICT, Pricing of ICT, we have as a first step developed a taxonomy of pricing 
parameters that, in addition to the price level, can be of interest in constructing a deal. In our 
taxonomy, we focus on five: the scope of the offering, from single product attributes to entire 
product systems; the buyer’s temporal rights, from single occasion to eternity; price formula, 
from price variable by volume or attributes to fixed price for the entire offering; the pricing 
mechanism, from price list, via negotiation and auction to exogenously determined price; and 
the pricing information base, from cost, via market prices to customer value (Westelius et al., 
2010). By attempting to direct attention at such parameters, the singular focus on price level 
can perhaps be broken and a richer pricing concept form the basis for differentiating the 
offering. But pricing is not just conducted in an isolated negotiation between a seller and a 
buyer. It takes place in a context that is increasingly often termed “ecology” – a value system 
consisting of many parties, and where no single party controls all the others. In this essay, I 
describe telecom ecologies (such as the iPhone, the Skype and the Google ones) to see how 
different actors collaborate and how compensation moves – or could move and be distributed 
– within the ecology. 
Ecologies 
According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the word ecology was coined by the German 
zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919). Based on the Greek words      , (meaning both a 
place to live and the interacting assembly of those living there, the household) and      , 
(study of), he wanted ecology to denote the relation of the animal both to its organic and 
inorganic environment (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011). In line with those intentions, 
ecology has today come to denote the study of organisms and populations and their relations 
and interactions with each other and the environment.  Relations and interactions in an 
ecology do not have a clear, common direction and are not controlled by an overarching intent 
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or purposefulness. This is why I here prefer the concept ecology, both to more linear ones, 
such as value chain or Porter’s value system (connected value chains), and to more non-linear 
definitions of value systems, value networks or value constellations (e.g. Normann & 
Ramirez, 1993) as they tend to build on ideas of an overarching intentionality or goal-
directedness. Ecologies can contain chains, but are not restricted to chains. Certainly, 
networks can be pure descriptions of relationships without maintaining that the networks are 
designed or maintained by some mastermind, but to avoid confusion stemming from how 
such terms have been used previously I choose the (now increasingly popular) ecologies due 
to its pronounced non-intentionality. Furthermore, I use the ecology concept in a system-
theoretical tradition, where a system is an analytical concept denoting what the analyst 
chooses to focus on rather than some pre-existing, fixed entity that the analyst discovers.  
A generic telecom ecology 
Figure 1 shows a schematic ecology description. 
 
Figure 1 A generic telecom ecology 
The ecology actors 
The blue arrows depict actors who form parts of a product and service flow from a specific 
end customer perspective. In order for an end customer to receive telecom services, hardware 
and software forming the basic telecom networks (telephony, the Internet, etc) is needed, as 
are carriers who operate parts of the networks and operators who have end customer contracts 
and lease or operate networks reaching those customers. Today, it is also common that there 
are applications resident in the end user terminals (handset, PC, etc), rather than in the 
telecom net. Such applications can be supplied by application sellers (e.g. Apple’s iStore, 
Android market and Nokia’s Ovi store) who are not part of the operators and who act as 
resellers to independent application developers, who in turn often use development platforms 
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that are not necessarily provided by operators (e.g. iOS SDK, Android SDK and facebook). 
Developers and manufacturers of telephones and other end user terminals serve as terminal 
providers (e.g. Nokia, Samsung, HTC and Apple) and often reach end users via operators or 
independent middlemen. Content suppliers, finally, contribute with material that end users 
may want to access via the telecom networks. Examples include entertainment companies, 
television networks, game companies, weather services and news agencies.  
 
In addition to such value system participants, further actors may participate directly in the 
delivery process, such as operation service providers (one of the yellow arrows at the top of 
the figure) who operate networks on commission, and other consultants who can aid in 
development, planning, valuation, market analyses or simply as extra capacity workforce. 
Some actors attempt to control other actors, for example national and supranational regulators 
and inspection agencies, and standards organisations. 
The ecology cash flows 
If we look at cash flows in the ecology, focusing on the payments that make delivery to end 
customers possible (the orange arrows in Figure 1) the majority originates from the end 
customers (enterprise customers and consumers), but some also stems from subsidy 
providers. These subsidy providers can be state, private or non-profit actors who want to 
enable potential end customers who lack sufficient ability to pay to also be able to use 
telecom services, or ensure that areas that operators deem commercially unattractive are 
provided with coverage. The results from a pricing perspective differ substantially depending 
on the type of subsidy. There are subsidy or aid projects that are so small, in relation to the 
market they operate on, that the subsidy providers become price takers and pay the current 
market price. There are aid projects where the operators decide to contribute by offering 
special rates or deliver services pro bono. And there are subsidy programs, like broadband 
coverage in sparsely populated rural areas in the USA, where the government has set service 
quality standards and prices based on some type of full costing for conventional, terrestrial 
networks, turning it into segments of marginal interest to terrestrial operators, while for 
example innovative satellite telecom companies, with a different type of cost structure, come 
to view it as a high-margin niche (Dankberg, 2011-01-17). 
 
The customers’ payments go to operators, but also to some (perhaps even increasing) extent to 
application vendors and content providers. For example, streaming video (video on demand 
and IP TV) increased sharply last year, has exceeded file sharing in traffic volume and is 
estimated to form more than 40% of traffic volume in a few years (Cisco 2010). Pricing is 
strongly market-based. Price levels at each market or market segment are largely determined 
by the one who sets the lowest prices. However, prices between markets can vary drastically, 
with differences of an order of magnitude or more. And since many operators are 
international, with some stronger and some weaker market positions and with ambitions to 
grow, it is not unusual for those entering a market to set a low price that the incumbents then 
need to match. The purpose of setting a low price can both be to buy market share, and to hit 
at the profitability of the incumbents. At industry conferences (e.g. Digiworld Summit, ITS 
and PTC, international conferences with a strong participation of representatives of telecom 
companies of different kinds) concern is voiced regarding how network operators (carriers 
and operators) will be able to cope with the investments needed to satisfy ever increasing 
traffic volumes while rates fall, sometimes drastically. In response to such concerns, it has 
now become common that the popular fixed price contracts, that became popular a couple of 
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years ago, are replaced by contracts with some kind of cap: either a price variable by volume 
above a certain volume, or a capacity limitation if a certain volume is exceeded. 
 
The application development and supply is segmented by the terminals’ operating system. To 
some extent this is also true for content. For consumer markets, standard prices have become 
adopted – for example a dollar or a euro per unit. These prices are obviously not based on 
product costing, since costing where the majority of costs are development costs are entirely 
dependent on the estimated sales volume – something that is extremely hard to predict in such 
markets. Neither are they customer-value-based, since it is unreasonable to assume that the 
majority of all the applications or all the content would have the same value to the customers. 
It appears more reasonable to see this pricing as a guess at the ability and willingness to pay at 
a mass market. A dollar or a euro is a price that an average customer could be willing to pay 
without getting upset if it turns out at the time of use that the experienced value is less than 
the price paid. 
 
Pricing of content is also affected by the abundant availability of free material via the Internet 
(within or outside the law). Pricing may here on the one hand depend on the prospective 
customers’ perceptions of the consequences of breaking the law, and on the other hand of 
their sense of justice: foremost their wish to award authors a fair compensation for their 
creations. Thus, neither in pricing of content does traditional product costing form a 
meaningful part.  
 
In order to deliver telecom services, operators need to purchase capacity from telecom service 
wholesalers and / or network equipment from hardware and software providers. Both these 
types of suppliers have increasingly standardised offerings on deregulated and increasingly 
competitive markets and are experiencing strong price pressure. Price-setting power therefore 
lies with the buyer, but prices can vary widely between markets. On the network equipment 
side the price pressure is increased because a strong player (Chinese Huawei) has a financially 
very strong owner (the Chinese government) and, according to a widespread view in the 
industry, other goals than traditional Western profit seeking. Some operators may also choose 
to buy services from players who can manage the network for them. Here, too, there is price 
pressure from the Chinese player, but each equipment supplier has a fairly strong position 
when it comes to operating their own equipment. 
 
Terminal developers and manufacturers (Nokia, Samsung, Apple, HTC, SonyEricsson, etc) 
interact with the platform providers (sometimes within the same group, sometimes beyond) 
and with operators and, possibly, application developers and application providers. Depending 
on the market, operators are buyers of the phones and other terminals that they bundle in post-
paid contracts with fixed monthly fee components, or end customers buy the terminals 
directly from producers (or via phone or computer retailers). This segment deals with 
distinctive consumer products developed from a target-costing view, where the expected 
volume of sales is obviously an important factor, but the prices are largely determined by the 
type of phone - smart phone, advanced mobile phone, simple mobile phone - and are 
relatively constant between product generations, even though the price of a given model falls 
rapidly as new models become more attractive. 
 
Pricing, and the conditions for pricing, can also be affected by other players. For example, 
governments tend to have the ambition to break monopoly-like situations by regulation – 
phone number migration, network owners’ right to choose whose traffic will be allowed on 
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the network, roaming charges, etc. In cases such as phone number migration, regulation has 
led to increased competition and operators vying for one another's customers, trying to buy 
them over. In the case of roaming charges, which is an important and lucrative source of 
revenue for many companies, the price cap has rather become a cartel price level that no one 
undercuts - why charge less than the permissible level? But regulators mainly affect operators 
and to some extent telecom wholesalers. Telecom equipment suppliers may however be 
affected by policy decisions - such as when India for national security reasons do not want 
Chinese equipment and Chinese telecom networks, providing the non-Chinese suppliers with 
a reduced price pressure on that market. 
 
Consultants such as research and analysis firms can affect pricing by developing comparative 
statistics and forecasting future developments. This both reduces information monopolies and 
aligns and drives expectations. 
 
The natural course of pricing in a system like the telecom world is that the competitive 
landscape will have a decisive influence. In an increasingly integrated world, which requires 
standardisation, the scope for differentiation is diminishing. Certainly, there are occasional 
statements such as "there is nothing wrong with being a pure bitpipe provider as long as one 
can make a good profit on it." But most actors seem to agree that it is difficult to obtain good 
profitability in such activities. The trends above tend to move the markets toward the 
economists’ perfect competition, while the technological development and the negligible cost 
of reproduction compared to investment costs make it very difficult to form a relevant – or 
joint – picture of "real" costs. Therefore, more and more players think along the lines of how 
to create more differentiated offerings through upstream or downstream integration – in-house 
or as partnerships. I now turn to those thoughts. 
Aspirations to get closer to end user revenues 
At the Telecom Conference PTC11 in Honolulu in January 2011, a number of voices were 
raised for the value of seeing beyond "your" step in a value chain or value system. For 
example, a Sri Lankan telecom operator head (Sidhu, 2011-01-17) noted that mobility has 
become essential in today's society, but that an operator cannot live on basic telecom 
connectivity and voice traffic. The trick is to offer experiences, something that companies like 
his DialogAxiata do not have in their original business plan. The challenge for operators is to 
manage expectations of the experience delivery, and to get customers to appreciate it as a paid 
service. Quality of Service (QoS), Service Level Agreements (SLA), exclusive content and 
end-user experiences through the network, this is what operators will need to learn to handle. 
Part of this is to become good at delivering things quickly, for example through partner 
organisations rather than by building everything yourself. An Indian Vodafone manager 
claimed that also telecom wholesalers need to become involved in content delivery, since, for 
example, different contents can have different quality requirements for IP packet transport 
(Jhamb, 2011-01-17). If all parties understand and contribute to the final delivery, the 
proceeds may also be shared between all parties. 
 
The need and the ability to differentiate offerings based on quality of service was underscored 
by a Singaporean telecom wholesale manager, among many others (Montefiore, 2011-01-17). 
Different customers have different needs for quick connection between end points (latency) 
and traffic volumes (Gb/s). Therefore, it should be possible to offer different versions at 
different prices. This is a customer value argument. Today it is mainly applied to customers 
with extreme requirements for point-to-point speed and availability (stock markets and 
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financial actors, in particular) who are willing to pay premiums on x10 or even x100 
compared with standard connections. If product differentiation could spread to mass markets, 
I find it likely that competition in the sale to the retail level will lead to a situation where 
customers' willingness to pay decreases rapidly as the competing providers undercut each 
other in terms of price / performance, and then you are back in a world where neither product 
costing nor customer value determine prices. 
Exploring ecologies – three examples 
One way to think along other lines is to achieve a greater integration between the actors, 
rather than restricting the interaction to simple and transparent transactions between two 
parties at a time in a standardized and well-defined market. Some successful examples of 
integration of this type are Apple's iPhone initiative, Skype and Google. These will now be 
described using the generic ecology actor and cashflow map as a framework. 
The iPhone ecology 
 
Figure 2 The iPhone ecology 
 
In the iPhone Network, Apple is a major player, offering terminals (iPhone, iPad, but also 
Macs), a marketplace for applications (App Store) and for content (iStore), a platform for 
application development (IOS SDK) and content delivery (iTunes and the file format AAC) 
and has strategic alliances with hardware manufacturers (ARM Ltd. of processors), operators 
(TeliaSonera, Vodafone, etc.) for mobile broadband contracts for the terminals, and content 
providers (both the major brands Sony, Universal, Warner and EMI, where the relationships 
at times have been very strained, and smaller, independent (indies)). This is already more than 
most competitors, but in addition, Apple has a relationship with tens of thousands of 
independent application developers who can sell their products (when their quality is 
approved by Apple) via App Store at pre-specified sales commissions to Apple. And, most 
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importantly, they have a relationship with consumers, both in terms of user communities and 
automated collaboration – deleting an app on your phone means that the assessment "one star" 
is sent to the App Store rating systems. The user community has both a positive charge – "the 
Apple world" – and takes advantage of customers' rejection of the giant Microsoft. In 
addition, up to now, Apple has had an advantage of not being market-dominant. If Microsoft 
had had an equally hard-integrated and locked solution, they would probably have had 
problems with competition-promoting authorities. Because of Apple’s success, regulators are 
now likely to take an increasing interest in the Apple network and business model. 
 
Payment-wise, it is Apple who charges the consumer for the sale of apps and content. They 
also sell some terminals to consumers, but to a large extent they sell through the operators, as 
part of operators' end-user traffic subscription offerings. The operators and other players 
“upstream” benefit from that an average iPhone has much more data traffic than conventional 
phones (30x) or previous smartphones (2.5 times). This increases demand for not only 
operators’ but also wholesalers’ and telecom equipment vendors’ offerings. The collaboration 
with independent app developers is also to mutual benefit. Apple does not take a risk in terms 
of development costs and gain access to a huge and constantly further developed app 
portfolio. Customers can, through other customers' assessments, orient themselves in the app 
supply concerning quality (or popularity). Given the potentially huge market and the unit 
price structure (the same app price to all consumers) it is not reasonable to try to price 
according to each consumer's perceived value. Instead, there is a great incentive to try to 
reach a mass market. A price that is so low that many people try the product will, if the 
product is good, lead to popularity ratings that generate additional sales. 
The Skype ecology 
 
Figure 3 The Skype ecoclgy 
The Skype case began with an application for computer-to-computer voice and video calls, 
with chat and file transfer options as a supplement. An important part of the application is that 
it is not limited to looking up the other users that exist, you can also see who is connected to 
the service at present. Skype use on the one hand hit the telephone operators' voice traffic, but 
on the other hand created data traffic in the networks and a demand for Internet access. The 
paid services Skype In and Skype Out – to make calls from regular phones to a Skype 
subscriber and vice versa – reinforce competition with phone operators as it makes a Skype 
account a "full" telephone subscription alternative, but simultaneously can be viewed as 
collaboration because the arrangement generates local calls at the conventional telephone end 
and requires Skype to buy capacity in traditional telephony nets that is then resold to Skype 
customers as paid services. 
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For international telephone traffic, which belongs to the more profitable services for 
operators, Skype has developed into a strong contender. According to Stephan Beckert, 
TeleGeography (2011-01-17) the volume of international Skype traffic is 42 billion minutes 
(in 2010) while the classical telephony volume is 15 billion minutes. Even if many Skype 
calls would never have taken place as paid calls in the telephony system, it is most reasonable 
to assume that Skype is a real competitor attracting some traffic away from telecom operators. 
In France, the telecom operators have launched contracts that include free international calls, 
which could be perceived as a countermeasure against the Skype expansion. Reportedly, half 
of the French subscribers had signed such contracts by early 2011. Pricing wise, free calling is 
obviously neither cost nor value-based, but is rather to be viewed as marketing activities to 
build customer base or defend market share that is expected to generate other revenue. 
 
Over time, collaboration developed between Skype and some mobile developers – and 
operators with growth ambitions – which enabled Skype calls as data traffic from mobiles. 
Previously, opposition to Skype was strongest from mobile-phone operators, as Skype calls 
cannibalised profitable voice traffic. Resistance continues, but once an operator starts to 
collaborate with Skype in a market, it may become important for others to not deny the 
existing and potential customers the same opportunity, to prevent that dissatisfied customers 
change service provider.  
 
In order to deliver good call quality – especially on video calls, which require the transfer of 
much larger amounts of data than phone calls – it became important for Skype to as quickly as 
possible transfer the call from the Internet (which is "best-effort" traffic) to the Ethernet 
connections, where transfer speed and packet delivery can be guaranteed, and to return the 
call onto the Internet as close as possible to the endpoint. The more of the call path that goes 
through the Internet, the greater the risk of disruption and poor quality of the call. The fast and 
easy solution for Skype is to rent capacity from wholesalers and operators, who then become 
customers and partners. And on routes where sufficient amounts of Skype traffic moves, as 
Skype grows, it becomes interesting for Skype to build their own transmission capacity, 
optimised for Skype traffic – and thus become a customer of network equipment suppliers and 
competitors to wholesalers and operators (Rosenberg, 2010-01-18 )). The business model is 
still to be dominant in IP-based voice communication with and without video by free software 
and services, and to receive revenues through paid services – which are priced based on 
market prices. A growing part of the business model is to be the voice and video platform for 
other service providers who purchase a license to use Skype's technology instead of 
developing their own solutions. 
 
Google Voice, a unified voice communications solutions from Google, where users can 
dynamically specify which of their configured telephones that should handle the call, also 
handles Skype, but as long as Skype is not SIP compliant (a telephony standard), Google 
Voice is not be able to replace Skype In. 
The Google ecology 
Unlike Skype and iPhone, the Google ecology does not have its beginning in a connection 
with telephony, but has slowly developed it. The core of the Google ecology is the Google 
search engine, which rapidly outcompeted the existing alternatives to such an extent that in 
many languages, searching the web has become a verb taking its name from the company, like 
the English “to google”. The search engine creates interdependence between web content 
providers and Google. Google's main source of revenue is advertising (Google AdWords), 
9 
 From industry norms on full costing to ecologies – on pricing principles in telecom 
Alf Westelius, Alf.Westelius@liu.se 
nd 22  European regional ITS conference, Innovative ICT Applications   Emerging Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues. Budapest, 18 21 September, 2011 
 
where Google offers an advanced from of content-sensitive advertising with dynamic pricing 
– the advertising client indicates its willingness to pay, and ad space is auctioned to the 
highest bidder for the specified search terms. 
 
Part of becoming dominant in the search market (and advertising) is to also offer 
complementary products such as Software as a Service - Gmail, Google Apps (corresponds to 
resident Office packages), Google Translate, etcetera. Google reserves the right to analyze the 
content of communication and searches through the free versions, to thus obtain a better 
picture of what people are interested in and thereby further improve the search engine. For 
companies, it is possible to pay for the products instead and then both avoid ads and content 
analysis. Even though there is a growing effort to get paying organisational customers, the 
overwhelming majority of Google's revenues still come from advertising sales. 
 
 
Figure 4 The Google ecology 
 
Since the entire Google offering is based on online services, the technical communication 
quality is important for the customer's use experience. The services need to be accessible and 
have short response times. Just as Skype has contracts with operators and wholesalers, as well 
as builds its own network capacity, Google has begun to do so (Gill, 2011-01-18). 
Optimisation of Google's network has two different components, with different requirements 
profiles. One is to move large amounts of data, but without the requirement for real-time 
performance. It is needed to, for example, place high-demand cached search material and 
search index at nodes near the major concentrations of users. The other is that customers’ use 
should be as fast, safe and uninterrupted as possible. Of course, both Google and Skype try to 
meet the requirements of telecom performance as cost-effectively as possible, but in neither 
case is their pricing based on cost estimates. What they charge for is priced in relation to 
prevailing market prices or, in the case of Google's ad sales, an auction process that will be 
reasonably close to a customer-value-based pricing. 
 
Over time, Google has come increasingly closer to the telephony sector, in step with how 
mobile platforms increasingly become everyday tools in society. Their development of the 
Android operating system; their introduction of “own” phones and HTC's continued 
investment; Sony Ericsson’s and others’ Android phones keep adding to the Google ecology, 
both directly through Google-customised terminals and because there is now a platform for 
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apps development of Google-compatible applications that attracts tens of thousands of 
developers to write hundreds of thousands of apps that have been downloaded millions of 
times. Less than one per cent of them reach a real mass market (more than 250,000 
downloads) and two-fifths will definitely not (less than 50 downloads). 65% are free apps and 
35% paid apps (Androlibs statistics page, visited 2011-01-21). This part of the ecology can be 
encouraged, but hardly controlled, by Google, and it is self-financing. 
Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, I think I can safely say that pricing in the telecom-ecology is not based on 
product costing but rather on market prices as determined by a complex interaction of factors 
– especially international strategic games between players. It also seems very unusual for 
pricing to be strictly based on customer value; the exception appears to be Google AdWords. 
Under these circumstances, the complex web of actors and their interdependencies becomes 
an important base for the pricing process, and considerations other than quantifiable costs or 
customer value govern the pricing. It is reasonable to assume that this result is based on the 
telecom world’s more and more investment-heavy and low-reproduction-cost structure that 
makes classic product costing difficult to use, and strong competition on fairly standardised 
markets, that make customer-value-based pricing difficult. As the IT component is increasing 
in many sectors, this may be a trend occurring in many parts of today's society, not just in 
telecom. 
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